General George B. McClellan

The judgment of most historians is that while he was in command of the Army of the Potomac, General McClellan was an overly cautious or timid Commander frozen into inaction by a concern about the strength of his force and the strength of the enemy.  For whatever reason, he, did not Lead his far superior forces into battle in the Peninsula campaign. But, there were also other reasons why McClellan did not Lead his troops into battle. Both are relevant to intelligence professional Leaders.

First of all, it must be said that there is evidence that McClellan had most of the core traits required by a Leader. His courage and competence in combat were demonstrated when he was a young officer under fire and performing reconnaissance in the Mexican War.  Later as the commander of the Union forces in the western part of Virginia, he won several minor battles.  Those first Union victories in the war were why he was brought to Washington following the disastrous battles of Bull Run and given command of the Army of the Potomac.

McClellan was also a man of vision.  During his days as a junior officer he had studied strategy, he observed the battle of the Crimea on which he wrote a critique calling for a major change in U.S. tactics and later he wrote manuals on bayonet warfare and cavalry operations.  Early in the war, he had drafted and proposed a unified strategy for conducting the war.  Certainly, upon taking over as Commander of the Army of the Potomac, He had a clear vision of what had to be done to transform the disorderly volunteers who lost at Bull Run into a real Army. He immediately focused on training the troops, motivating them to accept that they must change into trained soldiers and inspiring them and their commanders to think of themselves as an Army rather than individual units from various states. As a result, the Army came to trust and revere him as their Leader.  Thereafter, one of his greatest concerns was caring for his troops.

But, McClellan also had considerable experience as a manager.  As a young officer he had been involved in both the planning the routes and assessing the logistics required for the completion of a transcontinental railroad.  After resigning from the Army, he was president of several railroads in the mid-west.  In addition to organizing and outfitting  the Army of the Potomac, McClellan developed the defenses of Washington by creating the system of surrounding forts.  Based on McClellan’s successes with the Army of the Potomac and in organizing the defense of Washington, President Lincoln also saw him as the Leader that the entire Union Army needed.

On the basis of that recognition, Lincoln asked him to relieve old General Winfield Scott as “General in Chief”, equivalent to being Chief of Staff of the Army. In doing so, Lincoln expressed concern about McClellan also staying on as Commander of the Army of the Potomac. But, according Margaret Leach, McClellan responded “I can do it all.”---i.e., both Leadership as Commander of the Army of the Potomac and overall responsibility for direction and management of the entire war effort.

But, after that, McClellan “was absorbed in the perfection of elaborate plans and of his Army’s organization.”---i.e., management. He also found a scandalous system of military contracts put into effect by Secretary of War Cameron, which permitted the contractors to swindle the Army by providing sub-standard equipment. McClellan spent much time working to clear that up---i.e., management.  Unfortunately, the malaria he had contracted in the Mexican war returned and he also had a bout of typhoid fever.  Since he had not delegated his management duties as General in Chief, they continued to pile up and had to be dealt with from the sick bed and after his recovery.  Lincoln soon recognized that management was causing McClellan to neglect his Leadership of the Army of the Potomac and, so, relieved him as General in Chief.  Nevertheless, when he finally returned to the field, as Leader of the Army of the Potomac McClellan continued his concern with the logistics and support of the Army and was always doing battle with Washington over supplies---i.e., management. 

Marine Captain Kirk L. Freund, writing on “Management is a Vital Part of Leadership”  emphasizes that while “A successful military leader must be able both to manage and motivate---to achieve results.”  Yet he also highlights the dangers of trying to “Do it All” and letting management activity drive out the opportunity for Leadership.

A good example of management without motivation comes from the U.S. Civil War and the Army of the Potomac under General George B. McClellan.  McClellan took an army that was little better than a mob and quickly organized, trained and equipped it for war.  His soldiers abilities and morale soared, but when they reached the banks of the Rappahannock River and faced the Confederate Army at Fredericksburg, Virginia, McClellan would not lead them into battle and on to victory.  Eventually as McClellan repeated his pattern of organizing for battle but never fighting, he was relieved….

It is significant that after he was relieved of command the report that he wrote still emphasized management, Report of the Organization and Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac. It may have been this management focus which caused him to neglect emphasizing his Leadership of the Army into combat, but McClellan had other characteristics that also would cause problems.  In his earlier days as a young officer, he had problems of insubordination to senior political leaders.  He had also been a protégé of, then, Secretary of War Jefferson Davis.  In his peacetime years, he had supported Stephen Douglas’ campaign against Lincoln for President.  Clearly, he was not a good follower, the first requirement for a Leader. Thus, McClellan was bound to have problems with the political Leadership and Lincoln in particular.  He ignored Lincoln's initial suggestions, subsequent guidance and, finally direct orders to take the fight to the enemy.  Rather he continued to demand more material support.  As a result of these chain-of-command battles, he ultimately began to disparage his Commander to his staff and in letters to others and began to engage in anti-Lincoln politics.  By losing his integrity as a follower, he ultimately lost his position as a Leader.

Underlying McClellan’s delays while he sought additional resources and encouraging his caution in Leading the army into battle was another factor. Poor intelligence! During his time in the field facing the Confederates on the peninsula and at the approaches to Richmond, McClellan was getting what, in hindsight, has proven to be poor intelligence from his main source, the Pinkertons. They continually overestimated the Confederate strength by 2 or 3 to 1.  Being so committed to the management effort of  obtaining enough logistic support to initiate combat against the expected threat, McClellan neglected the leadership function of thinking realistically about the intelligence he was getting and making arrangements to get more accurate information to understand the actual threat. Intelligence is a function of command.

In retrospect and from a different perspective on his situation, it is possible to see McClellan not as a poor Leader. Rather, he can be viewed as a potential Leader who  devoted so much of his time and attention to management activities that he never got around to Leading. That overcommitment to management at the expense of Leadership undermined his integrity as a follower and ultimately cost him his job and his reputation.

Sources:

-James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (Oxford History of the United States).

-Margaret Leach, Reveille in Washington.

-Captain Kirk L. Freund, USMC “Management is a Vital Part of Leadership” in Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, November 1994.  

-William C. Davis, Lincoln’s Men.

-and also reference to Wikipedia.

General George Armstrong Custer

It is interesting to contrast McClellan with George Armstrong Custer who had been a member of McClellan’s staff and was elevated to General soon after McClellan’s relief from command.

 Custer exuded Leadership and loved to Lead men into battle, but he did not ignore management.  In the Civil War,

Custer’s men were disciplined of course.  Still it seems incredible that he could get thousands of Michigan boys to follow him in a charge against an obviously impregnable position.  But they did.  One reason was that Custer identified with his men.  He praised them at every opportunity, always in the grandiloquent style of the aged and with the added ingredient of Custer’s own enthusiasm.

[But also] He and his staff worked hard at getting top quality horses and arms for the men and saw to it that they were well fed and quartered whenever possible.

Further, within his brigade and division, Custer created an atmosphere of closeness, even uniqueness in a conscious attempt to make his outfits one big happy family.

Furthermore, Custer maintained his integrity as a follower.  Despite his personal streak of insubordination and the threats to his career which he incurred because of that, and despite his political views which were similar to McClellan’s, and despite the repeated attempts to draw him into politics, Custer did not speak out in opposition to his superiors.  Indeed, later when he did speak out, it was to maintain his integrity as a Leader by speaking out about corruption at the highest levels of the Grant Administration in an attempt to better the living conditions at the Army posts on the western frontier.

Sources:

-Stephen E. Ambrose in Crazy Horse and Custer: The Parallel Lives of Two American Warriors.