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Some Examples of Cultures in the Intelligence Community |
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Leadership for Intelligence Professionals |
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Learn to Lead learntolead@earthlink.net |
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Some Examples of Cultures in the Intelligence Community The Creation and Operation of a Clan Culture “The DO[CIA Directorate of Operations, i.e., humint collection] had set up a group called the Counter Proliferation Division (CPD) which was devoted to obtaining intelligence and thwarting the nuclear acquisition efforts of rogue states and non-state actors. A senior operations officer, very smart and operationally aggressive but with a reputation as difficult….was part of this new division. He asked me to return to
“The CIA created CPD under the command of Deputy Director of Operations Jim Pavitt…. Pavitt, a career operations officer was a popular choice in the Agency. Usually well dressed in a blue blazer and perky pochette, with a slightly manic side to his character, he quickly set up the division….
“To get CPD operations off the ground, Pavitt handpicked a dozen or so officers. Many of these men and women were undeniably brilliant and experienced, but many were eccentric and didn’t fit well in the traditional divisions which were based on geographical not topical boundaries. As a result, CPD quickly became known as the ‘island of misfit toys’….every operation in another divisions region had to be done with its cooperation and consent. Naturally this led to savage bureaucratic turf battles. In the post-9/11 world, with its huge paradigm shift in how we ranked our national security priorities , real money started to pour into CPD and the division suddenly became more popular.” From Valerie Plame Wilson, Fair Game, Chapter 3. “The CPD’s founder and first Chief was James Pavitt, a nattily dressed
“So, with the go-ahead of his bosses, Pavitt set to work hand-picking operations officers, some of whom had been unhappy in their previous assignments for various reasons And, not uncontroversially, he decided to include Non Officially Covered Officers (NOCs) such as Plame.…. …[a] former officer said ‘He brought over a whole crew of people, some of whom had been unhappy in their jobs, and gave them jobs and they were super loyal to him. They were raring to go and wanted to show the rest of the people [at the Agency] that they were just as good as they were….He created a corps of people.’
“From the outset, one of Pavitt’s first decisions created consternation among senior Agency management. ‘There was a big debate in 1996 about the use of NOCs in CPD.’…Until then, NOCs had been controlled by their own division, the Office of External Development. ‘But Jim didn’t want to have to deal with [the Chief of OED], he wanted to have his own NOCs. And there was this huge bureaucratic fight, and again Jim carried the day because of his relationship with Tenet.’” From Laura Rozen, "Afterword" to Fair Game by Valerie Plame Wilson
The Existence and Responses of a Hierarchical Culture Just before testimony of Attorney General Ashcroft and FBI Director Mueller, to the 9/11 investigating panel, the staff released a report citing several instances in which the FBI had tried but failed to improve its operations. The report said that the failures arose because of the Bureau’s organizational structure and turf conscious mangers. It alleged that in 1999 when the FBI tried to create an analytical organization, the effort was sunk by managers who feared they would lose power. Also, in 2000, when the head of the counter-terrorism division tried to get field offices to give more effort to terrorism, the Special Agents in Charge did not want to choose between counter-terrorism efforts and law enforcement efforts. From the "Staff Materials" of the Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States. Published July 22, 2004. |
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Think-Live Leadership |
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